As the WNBA and its players’ union edge toward what may become the most consequential Collective Bargaining Agreement in league history, the central dispute is crystalizing: Should players receive 50% of league revenue, coupled with expanded benefits and loosened prioritization rules?
This is not merely a financial question, it is a legal one, grounded in decades of sports-industry arbitration, labor law precedent, and hard-won victories across professional leagues.
History Shows That When Players Push, the Law Often Pushes With Them
The players’ demand for a 50% revenue split mirrors successful fights in other leagues. The NBA only reached its current revenue-sharing structure after years of contentious bargaining, but the most instructive precedent comes from baseball. In Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee (1995), an arbitrator struck down MLB’s attempt at unilaterally implementing a salary cap, reinforcing a foundational principle: owners cannot change economic structures without good-faith bargaining. The ruling restored the players’ leverage and reaffirmed their right to negotiate for a larger share of league economics.
That same principle applies here. If WNBA players can demonstrate that revenue sharing and salary structures are mandatory subjects of bargaining, as courts and arbitrators have long held, then the league cannot sidestep or slow-roll negotiations. Labor law history is firmly on the players’ side.
Benefits and Working Conditions Are Not “Extras”, They’re Legally Protected Bargaining Subjects
The WNBA players also seek expanded retirement contributions, guaranteed maternity protections, and more flexible prioritization rules. Federal labor law views these not as perks, but as core terms of employment. The Supreme Court made this clear in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner (1958): issues directly related to pay, hours, and working conditions must be bargained in good faith.
Professional sports have repeatedly reaffirmed this. Arbitration rulings in the NFL, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s collusion cases, demonstrated that benefits, free-agency restrictions, and contract structures are within the mandatory bargaining zone. The NFL was forced to pay nearly $200 million in damages after systemically restricting player movement, because the arbitrator ruled those restrictions violated the CBA and labor law principles requiring good-faith negotiation.
The WNBA’s prioritization rule, which limits offseason overseas play, fits directly into this category. Like MLB’s reserve clause litigation and the NFL’s early free-agency fights, such restrictions affect player autonomy, earning potential, and career trajectory. That places them well within the realm of issues the league must negotiate, not impose.
When Players Unite Around a Clear Economic Vision, Arbitration Usually Rewards Them
Consider the landmark Major League Baseball collusion arbitrations (Collusion I, II, and III, 1987–1990). Players alleged that MLB owners secretly agreed not to compete for free agents. The arbitrators agreed repeatedly. The rulings awarded players hundreds of millions and reshaped the league’s economic landscape.
When leagues attempt unilateral control over economic mobility or compensation, arbitrators tend to side with players.
Similarly, the NFL faced arbitration losses when it attempted to manipulate free-agency rules (e.g., the McNeil v. NFLlitigation leading to Reggie White’s settlement). These events forced the league into a more equitable revenue and salary-cap structure.
The WNBA’s own trajectory is now echoing these earlier eras. At stake is not simply money, it is recognition of the players’ economic value, labor rights, and bargaining power within a growing sports enterprise.
The Legal Winds Are Blowing in One Direction
If the WNBA attempts to maintain the status quo, limited revenue sharing, constrained benefits, and restrictive prioritization rules, it risks falling into the same legal traps that ensnared other leagues:
- Unilateral restrictions, like prioritization rules, have repeatedly been struck down or weakened through arbitration.
- Economic control measures such as limiting salary growth, historically invite union pushback and legal scrutiny.
- Failure to bargain in good faith over mandatory subjects has led to some of sports’ most costly arbitration losses.
The message from decades of sports-labor history is unmistakable: Players win when they stand firm, organize around clear bargaining objectives, and leverage arbitration-backed precedent.
A Turning Point for Women’s Sports
The WNBA–WNBPA negotiations are about far more than splitting revenue. They are about whether women athletes will finally gain the structural rights that male athletes secured only through generations of conflict, litigation, and arbitration victories.
If history is a guide, the players’ demands are not radical; they are overdue, and the case law suggests the law may once again be on the players’ side.
Footnotes
- Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
- Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
- Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
- Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
- Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009).
- Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).
- Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001) (per curiam).
- Hennepin Cnty. v. N. Stars Hockey Club, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
- Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent, 585 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
- Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 1995 WL 228359 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1995).
- Zimmerman v. Nat’l Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
Starr Howard, What the WNBA–WNBPA Can Learn From a Century of Sports Labor Battles (Nov. 20, 2025) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
